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HENRIE v. DERRYBERRY AND THE
CURRENT STATUS OF THE OKLAHOMA
ABORTION LAWS
Frank B. Pinzel
In view of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in
the abortion cases,' it was inevitable that numerous restrictive state
criminal abortion statutes would be challenged and found unconstitu-
tional for exceeding the guidelines established by the Court in respect
to the area of permissible state regulation of abortion.
The Roe v. Wade2 decision struck down the Texas criminal abor-
tion laws, article 1191-1194 and 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, as
violative of the fourteenth amendment. The statutes in essence made
it illegal to knowingly administer to or procure administration to a preg-
nant woman any drug, medicine or violence, to produce the destruction
of premature birth of the fetus; or furnish the means for procuring an
abortion, or attempting to produce the means to effect an abortion.
However, the statutes exempted procuring or attempting an abortion
under medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that the Texas statutes, which only per-
mitted an abortion as a lifesaving procedure, were invalid for abridging
the right of privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.3 This amendment guarantees certain fundamental rights,
including a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy within determined limits.4
The Oklahoma anti-abortion statutes were first passed in 1910 and
modeled after other similar statutes passed in the nineteenth century.
These earlier statutes were passed for various purposes such as encour-
aging the growth of the population or protecting the mother from the
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. at 164.
3. Id. at 153.
4. Id.
1
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deficient surgical practices then existing.5 In addition, the laws at-
tempted to protect the fetus which influential religious views deemed
to be a human being.6 Furthermore, the abortion laws strengthened
and gained impetus from the restrictive puritanical ideas prevalent at
the time.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bowlan v. Lunsford7 articulated
the -purpose of the Oklahoma anti-abortion statutes as being "enacted
and designed for the protection of the unborn child and, through it,
society.",
On January 31, 1973, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
in the case of Jobe v. State9 declared that two of the Oklahoma criminal
abortion statutes, sections 861 and 862 of title 21, were unconstitu-
tional as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment under the same reasoning as Roe v. Wade.10
Soon afterward, the Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma decided the case of Henrie v. Derryberry1 which
also challenged the Oklahoma abortion laws as well as other related
statutes on constitutional grounds. The original plaintiff in this suit was
Dr. W.J. Henrie, an osteopathic physician licensed to practice in Okla-
homa, who was convicted in 1962 under section 861. Subsequently,
he was incarcerated and had his physician's license revoked.
A collateral suit was then instituted seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief against enforcement of the Oklahoma abortion statutes
but since Dr. Henrie had died after his conviction, his successor was
substituted in order to bring this suit. Shortly thereafter, the court per-
mitted Dr. S. Allison, a psychologist, Dr. F. Hladky, a psychiatrist, and
Reverend J. Wolf to intervene and join the challenge to the statutes.
Relief sought by Dr. Henrie's successor on the constitutional
claims was denied 'because the state conviction was final and the federal
court held that a declaratory judgment attacking the rvalidity of a state
conviction was not appropriate.12 However, as to the intervenors, lim-
ited relief was granted.
5. Pain, A Call for Statutory Abortion Law Reform in Oklahoma, 24 OKLA. L.
REv. 243 (1971).
6. Id.
7. 176 Okla. 115, 54 P.2d 666 (1936).
8. Id. at 117, P.2d at 668.
9. 509 P.2d 481 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
12. Id. at 723,
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The intervenors were allowed to join since their occupations fre-
quently placed them in a position where they were requested to advise
and counsel pregnant women who were concerned for various reasons
about the advisability of bearing children and the possibility of obtain-
ing an abortion. Under sections 861, 862, and 714, one who advises
a woman to procure an abortion is also subject to the grave risk of crim-
inal prosecution if such advice leads to the procurement of an abortion.
In asserting the challenge to sections 861, 862, and 714, the court
held that since the intervenors were subject to direct personal detri-
ment, standing was granted. 13 Further, the intervenors' own interests
were at stake rather than those of the general public, thereby present-
ing a case or controversy subject to judicial resolution under article m
of the United States Constitution.
The Oklahoma statutes regarding the suspension or revocation of
a physician's license were also challenged. Under the provisions of
section 503 of title 59, the State Board of Medical Examiners is au-
thorized to suspend or revoke the license of any physician or surgeon
practicing in Oklahoma for unprofessional conduct; and section 509 of
the same title defines unprofessional conduct to include "procuring,
aiding or abetting a criminal operation or abortion." Thus a doctor per-
forming an abortion in Oklahoma is subject to having his license re-
voked or suspended.
Yet the court held that since the State Board of Medical Exami-
ners and its members who must enforce the statutes, were not joined
in the suit, the challenge to section 503 and section 509 was not pre-
sented in an adversary context and not justiciable. 4 Therefore, the
court did not have a case or controversy required under article HI
for federal jurisdiction and the constitutionality of section 503 and sec-
tion 509 was not considered.
As written, it appears that the authority granted to the Medical
Examiners to revoke a physician's license is too broad to be acceptable
under the Roe v. Wade'5 decision which permits the woman under the
advisement of her attending physician to determine, during approxi-
mately the first trimester, whether pregnancy should continue.' 6 State
13. Id. at 722; accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Plast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
14. Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 722 (N.D. Okla. 1973); accord, Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 241 (1937).
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intervention is prohibited during this period since "fundamental rights"
are involved and there is no "compelling state interest" in the health
of the mother sufficient to allow a limitation on her rights until about
the end of the first trimester.1 7
In considering the challenge to sections 861 and 862 of title 21,
the court assessed its similarity to the Texas statutes struck down in
Roe v. Wade.' 8 Section 861 makes it illegal to administer to, or advise,
or procure any woman to take any drug or substance or use any instru-
ment with the intent to procure a miscarriage, unless it is necessary
to preserve her life. Seotion 862 proscribes the solicitation by the woman
of any person, medicine or means, or submission to an operation with
the intent to produce a miscarriage unless it is necessary to preserve
her life. The court concluded that the Oklahoma statutes were
similarly broad as the Texas statutes invalidated in Roe v. Wade'0
in their proscription of acts related to an abortion except where the
mother's life was endangered. Thus the district court ruled section 861
and section 862 unconstitutional and unenforceable as violative of the0
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The question of the constitutionality of section 714 of title 21 was
treated differently. Under this statute, it is manslaughter in the first
degree, if the child or mother dies, to administer to any woman preg-
nant with a quick child or prescribe for, advise or procure any sub-
stance or use any instrument with the intent to destroy the child unless
such procedure is necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
In considering section 714, the court recognized Oklahoma's
strong public policy of protecting .the life of a quick child by imposing
a more severe sentence on one who destroys such a child than for an
abortion before the child quickens. Although section 714 is clearly
broader in its prohibition of abortion than as defined in Roe v. Wade,2"
due to the extremely sensitive and controversial nature of abortion and
the compelling state policy against it, the court abstained from inter-
preting seotion 714 or adjudicating its constitutionality.
Under the rules established by the Supreme Court,2 the state may
regulate the abortion procedure from and after the first trimester to
17. Id. at 155; accord, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 165.
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promote the preservation and protection of the health of the mother.
Only for the stage subsequent to viability may the state proscribe abor-
tion except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother.
Consequently, as written, section 714 appears to be substantially
broader than would be constitutionally permitted, since the Supreme
Court recognized that viability is usually placed at about 28 weeks while
quickening is usually accepted as occuring at 16 to 18 weeks. 22  Yet
the court abstained from passing on the constitutionality of the statute
by recognizing the established right of state courts to interpret or nar-
row a statute in order to uphold its constitutionality.23 Also cited was
Grayned v. City of Rockford2 4 in which the Supreme Court stated that
"it is not within our power to construe and narrow state laws." 25
In regard to the federal abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court
has set out certain principles indicating that the rule should not auto-
matically be applied where a federal court is dealing with a doubtful
issue of state law but rather in "special circumstances" which must be
determined on a case by case basis.2 6 One of these circumstances was
delineated in Harman v. Forssenius"7 where it was declared that if the
state statute "is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render
unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question,
it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked juris-
diction.Y'
The doctrine has been further defined to be properly invoked in
deference to the state courts only in situations where the question of
state law is "uncertain" such that a state construction would substantially
alter the constitutional question. 9 The reason given is the desirability
of avoiding undue conflict in federal-state relations as well as avoiding
unnecessary interference with proper state functions and premature
constitutional adjudications. However, the abstention rule cannot be
22. Id. at 132; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIoNARY 1261 (24 ed. 1965).
23. Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973); accord, United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
24. 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
25. Id. See also United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
26. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
492 (1949); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943).
27. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
28. Id. at 535. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 376 (1964); Livingston
v. United States, 364 U.S. 281 (1960); England v. Louisiana St. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
29. Lake Carrier's Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972); Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690 (1964).
1974]
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properly ordered for the sole purpose of allowing the state courts the
first chance to vindicate the federal claim.30
The question therefore is whether section 714 presents the "spe-
cial circumstances" necessary to apply the abstention doctrine. In
other words, is section 714 uncertain such that state court determination
would substantially modify the constitutional issue? Also, is it fairly
subject to an interpretation that would render the constitutional ques-
tion unnecessary? If not, the federal court had a duty to exercise its
jurisdiction and deal with the constitutional issue.
Section 714 does not seem to qualify under the rubric of "special
circumstances," for it appears to be no less vague or uncertain nor sub-
stantially less subject to an interpretation that would free it from "con-
stitutional infirmity"'" than section 861 which was held to be violative
of the fourteenth amendment. The main difference between the two
statutes, aside from punishment, is that section 714 does not apply to
an abortion procurement or operation until the fetus becomes a quick
child at about 16 to 18 weeks.3 2
As the dissent by Justice Douglas in Harrison v. NAACP33 points
out, the judge-made rule of federal abstention to adjudicate an unnec-
essary constitutional issue has been greatly expanded since the original
precedent in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.3 4 to the point where
it can be a "convenient excuse for requiring the federal court to hold
its hand while a second litigation is undertaken in the state court."3
This tactic unquestionably produces years of delay and the multiplying
of litigation expenses.
The question therefore, of the constitutionality of section 714 will
have to await further state litigation.
Two other Oklahoma statutes relating to abortion were also chal-
lenged. Section 713 of title 21 makes unlawful the willful killing of
an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother while section 863
proscribes the concealing of a stillborn child as well as the death of
a child under the age of two years. But since the intervenors were
not in a position to be subject to prosecution under these statutes, no
30. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Turner v. City of Mem-
phis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
31. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 43 (1970).
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959).
34. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See also Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101 (1944).
35. Harrison v, NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959).
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genuine case or controversy was present to allow the court to adjudicate
the constitutionality of these statutes.3 6
What, then, is the impact of Henrie v. Derryberry37 and the Su-
preme Court abortion decisions on the Tulsa area in regard to an actual
change of policy or practice of performing abortions? It appears to be
minimal. Of the four hospitals serving the community, none have ad-
mitted performing abortions or changing their policy to conform with
the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy under the fourteenth
amendment. The two religiously affiliated hospitals, St. John's and St.
Francis, still hold to the position that abortion is immoral because it is
the killing of a human being. At Hillcrest hospital, the issue is under
study by the board of trustees and the hospital as yet has not
changed its policy. The most flexible stance was offered by Doctors'
Hospital which takes the position that until the Oklahoma State Legis-
lature acts to change the laws, they will conform with the Oklahoma
statutes on criminal abortion notwithstanding the fact that sections 861
and 862 have been held unconstitutional. When and if the Oklahoma
abortion statutes are changed to conform with the Supreme Court
guidelines, they indicate that the performance of an abortion at Doc-
tors' Hospital will be left to the individual conscience of the doctor.
Recently however, an abortion clinic has opened in the city of
Tulsa. The clinic uses the vacuum method and performs abortions up
to ten weeks of pregnancy. Beyond that period it is still necessary for
one to seek a pregnancy termination outside the area.
Concerning the right of the hospitals to establish a policy of dis-
allowing abortions, the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton38 assured ade-
quate protection to hospitals to determine their own positions regarding
this matter. In that decision the Court upheld the validity of a Georgia
statute which leaves to the discretion of the hospital the decision of per-
forming an abortion, although legal, and prohibits the coercion of staff
doctors to perform abortions where it is objected to on moral and re-
ligious grounds.
In the wake of the Supreme Court abortion decisions and Henrie
v. Derryberry,39 the status of the Oklahoma abortion and related stat-
utes is still uncertain. Although sections 861 and 862, making it illegal
to perform or solicit an abortion, have been invalidated, one who per-
36. Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
37. Id.
38. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
39. 358 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Okla 1973).
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forms an abortion still runs the. risk of prosecution for manslaughter un-
der section 714 for procuring the destruction of an unborn quick child,
and under section 713 for the willful killing of an unborn quick child by
an injury committed upon the mother. Furthermore, under section
863, if the woman conceals the aborted fetus she is subject to prosecu-
tion. Lastly, to serve as a forceful deterrent, under sections 503 and
509 of title 59, a physician can still have his license revoked or sus-
pended for performing an abortion.
In order to eliminate the present uncertainty and the cloud of am-
biguity that envelops the entire issue of abortion in Oklahoma, it is im-
perative that the state legislature redraft the abortion laws in conform-
ance with the United States Supreme Court guidelines. Only in this
way will the state's legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the expectant mother and the potential life of the fetus be
effectively promoted. Likewise, women will then 'be able to take full
advantage of their constitutional right to terminate pregnancies in an
ambience of safety and security.
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